Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Reiss,J/Spreger,J, PG and Philippa Foot

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313 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
We take courage, temperance, wisdom and justice as moral, but Aristotle takes wisdom as intellectual [Foot]
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wisdom is open to all, and not just to the clever or well trained [Foot]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
Aletheia: truth [PG]
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
Ananke: necessity [PG]
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
Chronismos: separation [PG]
Diairesis: division [PG]
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
Diaphora: difference [PG]
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
Empeiron: experience [PG]
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
Enkrateia: control [PG]
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
Ergon: function [PG]
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
Eros: love [PG]
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
Genos: type, genus [PG]
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
Horismos: definition [PG]
Hule: matter [PG]
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
Meson: the mean [PG]
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
Morphe: form [PG]
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
Orexis: desire [PG]
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
Philia: friendship [PG]
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
Physis: nature [PG]
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
Theos: god [PG]
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
To ti estin: essence [PG]
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / a. Ancient chronology
323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG]
1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG]
750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG]
586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG]
570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG]
563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG]
540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG]
529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG]
500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG]
496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG]
472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG]
450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG]
445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG]
436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG]
170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG]
-200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG]
263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG]
310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG]
387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG]
523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG]
529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG]
427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG]
399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG]
387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG]
387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG]
367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG]
360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG]
347: death of Plato [PG]
343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG]
335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG]
330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG]
322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG]
307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG]
301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG]
261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG]
229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG]
157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG]
85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG]
78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG]
60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG]
65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG]
80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / a. Earlier European chronology
1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG]
622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG]
642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG]
910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG]
1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG]
1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG]
1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG]
1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG]
1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG]
1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG]
1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG]
1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG]
1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG]
1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / a. Later European chronology
1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG]
1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG]
1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG]
1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG]
1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG]
1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG]
1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG]
1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG]
1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG]
1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG]
1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG]
1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG]
1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG]
1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG]
1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG]
1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG]
1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG]
1798: the French Revolution [PG]
1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG]
1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG]
1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG]
1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG]
1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG]
1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG]
1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG]
1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / a. Modern philosophy chronology
1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG]
1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG]
1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG]
1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG]
1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG]
1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG]
1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG]
1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG]
1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG]
1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG]
1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG]
1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG]
1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG]
1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG]
1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG]
1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG]
1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG]
1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG]
1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG]
1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG]
1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG]
1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG]
1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG]
1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG]
1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG]
1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG]
1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG]
1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG]
1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG]
1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG]
1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG]
1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naďve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot]
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot]
I don't understand the idea of a reason for acting, but it is probably the agent's interests or desires [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
There is no restitution after a dilemma, if it only involved the agent, or just needed an explanation [Foot, by PG]
I can't understand how someone can be necessarily wrong whatever he does [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
It is not true that killing and allowing to die (or acts and omissions) are morally indistinguishable [Foot]
Making a runaway tram kill one person instead of five is diverting a fatal sequence, not initiating one [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivists give the conditions of use of moral sentences as facts about the speaker [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Unlike aesthetic evaluation, moral evaluation needs a concept of responsibility [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot]
The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
Moral judgements need more than the relevant facts, if the same facts lead to 'x is good' and 'x is bad' [Foot]
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Whether someone is rude is judged by agreed criteria, so the facts dictate the value [Foot]
We can't affirm a duty without saying why it matters if it is not performed [Foot]
Moral arguments are grounded in human facts [Foot]
Facts and values are connected if we cannot choose what counts as evidence of rightness [Foot]
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
Being a good father seems to depend on intentions, rather than actual abilities [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot]
Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot]
Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot]
The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Most people think virtues can be displayed in bad actions [Foot]
Virtues are intended to correct design flaws in human beings [Foot, by Driver]
Actions can be in accordance with virtue, but without actually being virtuous [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtues are corrective, to resist temptation or strengthen motivation [Foot]
The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot]
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Maybe virtues conflict with each other, if some virtue needs a vice for its achievement [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance is not a virtue if it results from timidity or excessive puritanism [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
The practice of justice may well need a recognition of human equality [Foot]
Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Courage overcomes the fears which should be overcome, and doesn't overvalue personal safety [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]
Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We sometimes just use the word 'should' to impose a rule of conduct on someone [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The right of non-interference (with a 'negative duty'), and the right to goods/services ('positive') [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot]
In the case of something lacking independence, calling it a human being is a matter of choice [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Some words, such as 'knife', have a meaning which involves its function [Foot]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]